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WHO IS THIS REPORT FOR? 
This report is for donors, global policy makers, and civil society actors concerned with “land investments,” which are 
defined as agriculture, forestry, wind and solar energy, and similar projects. In particular, it is for such actors who seek 
to improve the governance and accountability of land investments, protect and bolster the rights of project-affected 
communities, and enhance development outcomes linked to land investments. For actors already working on 
advancing transparency of land investments, this report offers new insights for achieving transformative change.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
How can transparency improve the governance and accountability of “land 
investments,” such as agriculture, forestry, wind and solar energy, and similar projects?  
Land investments have long been characterized by poor governance and 
accountability, which is often exacerbated by inadequate information sharing and the 
exclusion of communities from decisions that will affect them. The Covid-19 crisis 
amplified these challenges. Governments fast tracked project approvals to the 
exclusion of communities and intensified criminalization and persecution of rights 
defenders. Reductions in government monitoring of investments were accompanied 
by opportunistic regulatory rollbacks. Opaque actions taken during the fog of the 
pandemic will have long-term implications, including an increased risk of social conflict, 
imperiling recovery efforts and even increasing the risk of governmental collapse.
Rice threshing, Lampang, Thailand  
© Shutterstock/Chatrawee Wiratgasem.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Transparency is often seen as a means of improving 
governance and accountability. But its transformative 
potential can be hindered by vagueness concerning how 
“transparency” is defined and who it is intended to serve. 
Transparency is too often used interchangeably—and 
erroneously—with “disclosure,” effectively protecting powerful 
actors from changes in the status quo. Existing transparency 
and governance initiatives also fall short on meeting 
communities’ transparency needs, precisely because such 
initiatives focus on other beneficiaries, such as commodity 
buyers or international civil society actors.  
This report seeks to re-orient conceptions of transparency in 
ways that can lead to more transformative impacts—
particularly for local rights holders—in the governance of land. 
Reorienting understandings of what land investment 
transparency means can also benefit governments, 
companies, and other actors by enabling them to more 




“Land investment transparency” (LIT) is public disclosure of 
relevant land investment-related information, as well as the 
ability of people to access, understand, and use that 
information. LIT entails an ecosystem of open systems and 
processes, in which project-affected community members can 
participate and influence decisions that will affect them. These 
elements can support community members in exercising their 
rights, anticipating and avoiding negative impacts, resolving 
grievances, seeking redress, and driving their own development. 
Governments have a legal duty to ensure land investment 
transparency, which is based in the binding norms of 
international human rights law. In addition, companies and 
investors have responsibilities to respect human rights, which 
means that they, too, must work proactively to advance the 
components of LIT within their control. 
 
RELEVANT ACTORS 
This report divides the actors relevant to land investment 
transparency into two groups:  
1.     Project-affected communities and the actors who 
support them. This group is often sidelined from 
investment-related decision-making. It includes all 
community members, not only leaders, and allies such 
as Indigenous and peasant organizations, civil society 
organizations, and paralegals and other experts 
supporting communities. 
2.     “Gatekeepers.” These actors control access to relevant 
information and how policy and decision-making 
processes around land investments function. 
Gatekeepers include host governments, companies 
carrying out land investments, as well as lenders, equity 
investors, and other actors in the investment chain. 
 
CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED BY COMMUNITIES AND THEIR 
ALLIES 
Communities, their allies, and other actors experience a range 
of challenges, which diminish land investment transparency.  
Disclosures fall short. Information is usually not disclosed early 
enough, and some information and documents are never 
disclosed. A lack of proactive disclosure puts the burden on 
communities to track down information, exposing them to 
additional risks and costs. Disclosed information can also be 
inaccurate, used by gatekeepers as part of “information wars.” 
Communities struggle to access information. Information, 
when disclosed by gatekeepers, often does not reach 
communities. Instead it can remain inaccessible in faraway 
government buildings or online. Gatekeepers, too, are often 
inaccessible for community members, limiting communities’ 
ability to obtain key information.  
More is needed to enable communities to understand 
available information. Communities often start with a low 
understanding of their rights and other technical issues, which 
can impair their ability to obtain and understand information 
about proposed projects. When technical information is 
disclosed, it can remain incomprehensible unless gatekeepers 
or others take the time to summarize, translate, and convert it 
into a form that can be understood by community members. 
Communities face barriers to using information and to 
participating in open decision-making processes. One limiting 
factor to communities’ use of information is that investment-
related decisions are often made behind closed doors, without 
community participation. In addition, the ability of 
communities to use information to influence decision-making 
is regularly undermined by their lack of leverage. This is linked 
to governments’ reluctance to recognize community land 
rights or their rights to free, prior and informed consent, which 
would enable communities to influence or control whether or 
not projects take place and on what terms. Communities are 
regularly faced with governments that rely on company 
information to the detriment of community perspectives, and 
with regulators that often neglect their mandates, thus 
undermining accountability. Although good faith regulators 
and other “reformers” within government can help to bolster 
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community participation in decision-making, those 
government actors are also frequently undermined by more 
powerful actors. Less obviously, communities seeking to use 
information to influence decisions may find that gatekeepers 
may sometimes cede to community requests for information 
and participation merely as a strategy to dampen pressure for 
deeper systemic changes. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The big picture 
Donors, global policy makers, and civil society organizations 
should: 
•       Conceive of transparency as extending beyond 
disclosure, to include community access, 
comprehension, and use of information in open 
decision-making processes and governance systems. 
•       Ground transparency efforts in the needs of 
communities and other local actors.  
•       Support or implement transparency efforts that seek to 
navigate, change, or circumvent political barriers.  
•       Strategically support or implement transparency 
programming when it is needed to complement—or to 
fill voids created by the blockage of—more 
transformational frameworks for improving the 
governance and accountability of land investments, 
such as human rights, access to justice, and the 
protection of legitimate tenure rights. 
 
Concrete strategies 
Various strategies can be employed to improve aspects of land 
investment transparency, provided they are adapted to the 
local context and do not introduce unacceptable risks for 
communities.i Gatekeepers may resist such strategies. Actors 
who understand gatekeeper incentivesii can more effectively: 
identify appropriate openings for improvement; change the 
political context to remove barriers imposed by gatekeepers; 
or circumvent gatekeepers to achieve desired results through 
other actors or means. 
Donors, global policy makers, and civil society organizations can 
contribute to the effective use of each strategy. In broad terms: 
•       Donors can support the effective implementation of 
these strategies. 
•       Global policy makers can underscore when and how 
international norms support or even require such 
strategies and can incorporate such strategies in their 
activities when appropriate. 
•       Civil society organizations can raise awareness about, 
support communities to use, and advocate for 
gatekeeper acceptance of, such strategies. 
Strategy 1: Driving agendas with community-led processes, 
such as autonomous protocols, bylaws or development plans. 
By using such processes to articulate how decisions should be 
made concerning their lands, resources, and development, 
communities can directly grapple with political barriers to 
increased transparency. 
Strategy 2: Increasing technical support for communities. 
Communities that have access to the support they need can 
more easily access, understand, and use information to 
influence decisions and participate in land governance. 
Strategies to secure private sector funding for independent 
support can increase the amount of support available to 
communities. 
Strategy 3: Empowering good faith regulators. Communities’ 
ability to access and understand information and influence 
investment-related decisions can be bolstered when regulators 
are empowered and incentivized to faithfully carry out their 
mandates. 
Strategy 4: Implementing multi-stakeholder and 
participatory processes. When appropriate, multi-stakeholder 
dialogues or joint monitoring or fact-finding can create new 
avenues for communities to obtain relevant information, share 
their perspectives, and seek to understand and influence 
decision-makers. 
Strategy 5: Factoring community-generated information into 
investment-related decisions. By generating their own 
information, communities can break gatekeepers’ control over 
the information upon which decisions are made. 
Strategy 6: Initiating domestic mechanisms to increase 
public access to information. Mechanisms like right-to-
information laws and parliamentary-approval processes can 
help to increase disclosures and make investment-related 
decision-making more accountable to rights holders and their 
representatives. 
Strategy 7: Extending community participation beyond 
individual projects to the policy level. Communities who can 
influence laws and policies can help systematically improve 
legal requirements for more effective disclosure and 
community access, comprehension, and use of information in 
open decision-making processes. 
NOTES 
i           Risks of increased transparency are discussed at pages 20–21. 
ii         Gatekeepers incentives are explored at pages 16–19. 
PART 1 
FRAMING
HOW CAN TRANSPARENCY IMPROVE THE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
OF LAND INVESTMENTS?  
Transparency is often seen as a means to important ends, such as improving 
governance and accountability. But its potential to do so can be hindered by 
vagueness concerning what transparency means and who it is intended to serve. This 
report therefore seeks to re-orient conceptions of transparency in ways that can lead 
to more transformative impacts—for local rights holders, and other actors—in the 
governance of land.  
 
The problem 
Despite the important efforts behind a raft of court cases, campaigns, and other hard-
won commitments for improved land governance, communities continue to be 
sidelined in the planning and implementation of land investments. Communities also 
Farm worker, Mali.  
© Shutterstock/Riccardo Mayer.
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bear the brunt of poorly designed projects, which can place 
their human rights, livelihoods, and, in many cases, lives, at risk. 
Excluding communities from investment-related decision-
making processes not only produces devastating outcomes for 
communities: it can also result in conflict and other challenges 
that are extremely damaging for companies, debt and equity 
investors, and host governments, among others.  
The Covid-19 crisis amplified existing dynamics around land 
investments. It provided an excuse for the fast tracking of 
project approvals to the exclusion of communities1 and 
intensified criminalization and persecution of rights 
defenders.2 Reductions in government monitoring of 
investments3 were followed by opportunistic rollbacks of 
important legal protections.4 Untransparent actions taken 
during the fog of the pandemic will have long-term 
implications, including an increased risk of social conflict,5 
imperiling recovery efforts and even increasing the risk of 
governmental collapse.6 
 
The relevance of politics and power 
The current state of land investment reveals that powerful 
actors like host governments and companies are often not 
sufficiently incentivized to meaningfully include communities 
in decisions affecting them. The problem is in part political. 
Few actors are willing to cede power. Any attempts to advance 
transparency must therefore take power seriously. Political 
barriers to transparency and power imbalances are also 
inherently linked to broader structural challenges that shape 
the governance of land investment, which include conflicting 
visions of development, overlaps in mandates and agendas, 
skills and resource shortages, other failures to implement 
existing laws and policies, and continuing threats to human 
rights and civic space. 
So how can transparency help? 
Framing certain interventions through the lens of transparency 
may help to dismantle the systemic barriers that prevent local 
communities from knowledgably participating in the 
governance of their lands and resources.7 Transparency is often 
more accepted by powerful actors than other approaches to 
improving governance. For instance, calls for governments and 
companies to respect human rights are often sidelined or 
ignored. Likewise, calls to recognize and protect communal 
tenure are regularly subject to intense resistance from elite 
actors,8 or to alternative pushes for land privatization.9 
Transparency, on the other hand, is often invoked in processes 
and interventions when protections for communal land tenure 
and human rights are notably and regretfully excluded—such 
as in trade agreements (see Box 3, below), and aid and 
financing assistance from the Bretton Woods Institutions.10 
This report does not advocate for the abandonment of human 
rights, accountability, or protections of communal tenure in 
donor and development programming. Instead, it explores 
how transparency can complement those programmatic 
focuses where they are likely to be resisted. Transparency is 
best viewed as one piece of a suite of measures needed to 
ensure accountable and responsive governance of land and 
land investments. Such measures also include efforts to 
bolster the empowerment and agency of local stakeholders, 
and to hold misbehaving actors to account.11 Empowered and 
informed communities, recognized and respected human 
rights, and open and accountable decision-making systems 
can in turn improve governance outcomes for all actors.  
Yet transparency is too often used interchangeably—and 
erroneously—with “disclosure.” This, too, is often due to political 
factors. Transparency initiatives may settle for advancing 
disclosure as the “lowest common denominator” issue to which 
powerful actors will agree (see Box 2, below).12 Such actors can 
respond to popular pressure for transparency by disclosing certain 
information, but without opening up spaces for communities to 
pursue substantive changes to how decisions are made.13 A thin 
version of “transparency” is thus advanced, while the underlying 
challenges around power imbalances and a lack of 
accountability remain unaddressed. Deepening understandings 
of what land investment transparency means can help unlock 
its potential for transformative change for investment-affected 
communities. Such change can also benefit governments and 
companies who can better avoid or mitigate the considerable 
costs of community grievances and social conflict.  
 
Grounding transparency in community perspectives 
Rather than assuming that transparency in itself will help 
improve governance or accountability,14 initiators of 
transparency interventions need to ask the question, “for 
whom?”15 When transparency efforts have commodity buyers 
(see Box 3, below) or international actors (see Box 2, below) as 
their intended beneficiaries, their potential for enabling 
communities to better access, understand, and use 
information in open decision-making processes is reduced. 
This can also limit the ability of such efforts to bolster rights 
protections and facilitate sustainable development. This 
report therefore builds on existing research on the 
transparency of land-based investment16 and emerging rights 
holder-focused approaches17 to further ground conceptions of 
transparency in the perspectives of local actors. 
Rather than assuming that transparency in itself will help 
improve governance or accountability, initiators of transparency 
interventions need to ask the question, “for whom?”
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Report overview 
This report draws on desktop research, country research in 
Cameroon and Liberia, and interviews with communities, civil 
society, government, the private sector, and development 
finance institutions (DFIs) from around the world. Insights 
drawn from interviews are either signposted in the text or 
referenced with endnotes. More information is included under 
Methodology, page 37, below. 
The report starts by defining land investment transparency (LIT), 
explaining its links to governments’ obligations, and outlining how 
it benefits a range of actors. The report then examines two groups 
of relevant actors: (1) communities and their civil society allies, 
and (2) “gatekeepers” to information and decision-making 
processes (such as host governments, companies, and lenders). 
In the following section, the report unpacks each element of 
transparency, namely disclosure, as well as information access, 
comprehension, and use in open processes. To enable a politically 
informed understanding of openings for advancing transparency, 
the report then describes the potential incentives that motivate 
gatekeepers. The risks of increased transparency are also 
investigated. The report then sets out a range of transparency-
related challenges that communities and their allies experience. 
Next, the report proposes various strategies and approaches that 
hold the prospect of improving or advancing land investment 
transparency, before concluding with recommendations for 
donors, global policy-makers, and civil society organizations. 
WHAT IS LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY? 
The definition: disclosure, access, comprehension, use, 
and open processes  
“Land investment transparency” (LIT) is public disclosure of 
relevant land investment-related information, as well as the 
ability of people to access, understand, and use that 
information.18 LIT therefore entails an ecosystem of open systems 
and processes, in which project-affected community members 
can participate and influence decisions that will affect them. 
These elements can support community members in exercising 
their rights, anticipating and avoiding negative impacts, resolving 
grievances, seeking redress for negative impacts suffered or rights 
violated, and, ultimately, more effectively pursuing their own 
vision of sustainable development.19 
 
Government duties concerning transparency 
Governments have a legal duty to ensure land investment 
transparency, which is based in the binding norms of international 
human rights law.20 LIT is grounded in various human rights,21 
including the freedom to seek and receive information,22 the right 
to take part in public affairs,23 and the right to an effective 
remedy.24 Other human rights that serve as bases for LIT include 
human rights to property and resources,25 development,26 
culture,27 health,28 a healthy environment,29 and food,30 as well as 
the international rights of Indigenous and tribal peoples.31 
BOX 1: THE ELEMENTS OF LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY EXPLAINED
•    Public disclosure refers to the sharing of all relevant information with rights holders and the public at large through 
a variety of media.  
•    Access refers to the ability of communities and other actors to safely obtain the relevant information. It includes 
measures that bridge the gulf that can exist between remote communities, on the one hand, and information 
holders and repositories, on the other.  
•    Understanding information entails the information being shared or converted into a comprehensible format for 
rights holders, including being translated to local languages and appropriate complexity levels, and otherwise 
adjusted to local contexts and cultures. It also means having sufficient time and technical support to digest both 
the information and the broader context of rights, processes, and drivers for the investment. 
•    Information use and open systems and processes are inherently linked. Communities who are informed and able 
to access relevant decision-making processes and other governance systems before decisions are made have the 
best chances of effectively participating in and influencing them. Such processes include investment planning and 
project authorization processes, government systems for monitoring and enforcement, and the resolution of 
community grievances. Other relevant systems include those driving the development of public policies and laws, 
right-to-information processes, and justice systems.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT  |  11
TRANSPARENCY FOR WHOM? GROUNDING LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY IN THE NEEDS OF LOCAL ACTORS
The legal obligations linked to those human rights mean that 
governments have duties to proactively advance transparency. 
Advancing transparency should thus be seen as a core 
component of government agencies’ mandates. Poor 
government performance on transparency is not, then, simply 
unfortunate, but rather a dereliction of legal obligations. In 
addition, company and investor responsibilities to respect 
human rights mean that they too must work proactively to 
advance the components of LIT within their control. 
 
The business case for transparency 
While LIT clarifies various obligations and responsibilities for 
governments, companies, and other actors—for instance, 
concerning disclosure and participatory decision-making—it 
can also produce advantageous outcomes for them. When 
communities are informed and participate in decisions as 
empowered counter-parties, companies can better 
understand local perspectives and circumstances and more 
effectively manage risks of rights violations, costly local 
conflict, and associated project delays and failure.32 Lenders 
and equity investors also benefit from such outcomes, which 
minimize their financial, legal, and reputational risks.  
For governments, these outcomes minimize the risks of adverse 
legal claims from investors, tarnished national reputations as an 
investment destination, and the undermining of the 
government’s political legitimacy among its constituents and 
institutional partners. LIT can improve operational outcomes for 
governments, as well: it can strengthen intra-governmental 
coordination and knowledge sharing, which in turn can enhance 
decisions, policy making, and performance of public mandates. 
LIT can also help governments with environmental stewardship: 
for instance, recent research reveals correlations between prior 
consultation requirements and reduced rates of deforestation.33 
 
THE ACTORS: COMMUNITIES, ALLIES, AND GATEKEEPERS 
This report divides the actors relevant to land investment 
transparency into two groups. The first group is project-affected 
communities and the actors who support them. This group is 
often sidelined from investment-related decision-making, and 
communities left to suffer the negative impacts afterwards. The 
second, “gatekeepers,” are the actors that control access to 
relevant information and how policy and decision-making 
processes around land investments function.34 They often 






All relevant, accurate information is 
shared and made public in a timely 
manner.
Communities and other actors can 
safely obtain the relevant information.
Communities can access 
decision-making processes and 
knowledgeably influence them. 
More generally governance 
systems are open and 
democratically responsive.
Information is in understandable formats, 
including being translated to local languages, 
adjusted to appropriate levels of complexity, and 
calibrated for the local context and culture. 
Communities have sufficient time to digest 
information and can access technical support.
Source: Sam Szoke-Burke and Michael Morgan.
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control the degree to which communities can knowledgably 
participate in decisions, and may actively or inadvertently 
restrict opportunities for systemic change.  
 
Communities and their allies 
“Communities affected by land investments” include formal 
community representatives such as chiefs and elders, as well 
as all other community members, including groups like 
women, youth, people with disabilities, Indigenous peoples, 
and minority ethnic groups. This includes communities and 
community members who have legitimate tenure rights over 
lands and resources, as well as all community members whose 
human rights are, or stand to be, affected by land investment 
projects. The unique transparency needs of community groups 
such as workers linked to land investment projects35 and small-
scale producers who sell commodities to companies are 
outside the scope of this report.36 
Community allies are those who support project-affected 
communities. Allies may accompany or provide technical 
support to communities from the earliest stages of project 
proposal right through to pursuing justice or redress for rights 
violations and negative impacts. Allies can also include those 
advocating on project-affected communities’ behalf in broader 
policy contexts. Allies therefore include: Indigenous and 
peasant organizations; social movements; local, regional, 
national, and international civil society organizations; as well 
as paralegals, scientists, and other experts providing technical 
support to communities. Allies can be distinguished from other 
data intermediaries whose objectives are not necessarily 
subservient to those of communities, such as journalists and 
open data initiatives—although there may often be overlap 
between these two groups.37 
 
Gatekeepers 
The gatekeepers this report focuses on are: 
•        Host governments, including public entities and actors at 
local, regional or national levels tasked with attracting, 
screening, monitoring, and regulating land investments. 
•        Companies and individuals who carry out land investments. 
•       Investment chain actors, including lenders to, and 
equity investors in, land investments. Such actors are 
diverse, ranging from pension funds, investment funds, 
and other asset owners, global banks, multilateral and 
country DFIs, local financial institutions, and impact 
investors, among many others.
Other gatekeepers who can have influence over the 
advancement of transparency include export credit agencies, 
which provide insurance against political and other types of 
non-commercial risk, and supply chain actors, including 
buyers and traders of commodities produced in land 
investment projects.38 While not a principal focus of this report, 
such actors also have the potential to block or advance LIT. 
 
Overlap 
Each of these groups can occupy the other side of the coin in 
specific cases: gatekeepers need information, while 
communities and their allies control access to certain 
information. Certain individuals may also fall into both groups. 
For host governments, companies, and other gatekeepers, 
compliance with their respective human rights duties and 
responsibilities will also often depend in part on their ability to 
access, understand, and use relevant information. Government 
representatives without relevant information are more likely to 
make poor decisions and are less able to properly regulate 
investment. Companies that lack important information are 
more likely to ignore community perspectives and to make 
under-informed decisions that lead to mutually disadvantageous 
outcomes. Although not the focus of this report, insights 
concerning these actors’ information needs—and the 
importance of their using such information—are also shared.  
Communities and their allies can also occupy the space of 
gatekeepers, especially regarding information generated by 
the community: see 5. Factoring community-generated 
information into investment-related decisions, below. 
PART II 
LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY  
FOR COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ALLIES
This section unpacks the key elements of land investment transparency: disclosure, 
access, understanding, and use in open systems and processes.  
 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
Public disclosure refers to the sharing of information with rights holders and the public 
at large. Disclosure should usually be public, rather than only to communities and their 
allies, in order to reinforce broader governance and accountability measures, and also 
in recognition of the rights of all citizens to information.39 Governmental duties to 
disclose come from their international human rights law obligations and often from 
domestic laws and constitutions. Companies and investment chain actors’ 
responsibilities to respect human rights create responsibilities to disclose; companies 
may also be required to disclose by host or home government laws and by loan 
agreement conditions. Investment chain actors may disclose project-related 
information according to their own right to information or disclosure policies.
Maasai community meeting, Tanzania. 
© Shutterstock/soft_light
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For disclosure to have any impact, the information disclosed 
must be relevant and useful to the intended users of that 
information.40 Such information must also be accurate, 
definitive, and up-to-date, necessitating regular, timely 
updates. Disclosure should be proactive, to avoid communities 
and allies investing significant effort and resources into 
information requests. 
Communities and their allies may need a diverse set of 
documents and types of information in order to protect 
community rights and knowledgably influence decisions 
concerning community lands and resources. A comprehensive 
list of information and document types is included in the 
Annex, below. In summary, communities and allies may need 
a range of information and documents concerning: 
•       Rights and responsibilities of all relevant actors, 
relevant decision-making processes, and other elements 
of legal frameworks. 
•       The proposed land investment project, including its 
purpose, location and timespan, and projected potential 
positive and negative impacts (which may be included in 
impact assessment reports).  
•       The company (or companies) carrying out the project. 
•       Investment chain actors linked to the project. 
•       Buyers of commodities produced by the project and 
other value chain actors. 
•       Available avenues for grievance redress. 
•       The terms of rents and other transfers to be made to the 
community. 
•       Regular, timely, and meaningfully disaggregated 
disclosure and reporting on company performance and 
impacts, once the project begins. 
•       What happens after the project ends, including who 
ownership of the land reverts to, how resulting damage 
to the land is repaired and remediated, and what 
happens to any community “benefit” sharing 
arrangements. 
Communities will usually be especially interested in 
information about projects or decisions concerning nearby 
lands and resources.41 The specific information needs of each 
community, and members within it, however, will vary 
depending on their objectives and the strategies they wish to 
pursue, as well as other context-specific factors. 
INFORMATION ACCESS 
The benefits of information disclosure are dramatically 
reduced if relevant communities cannot easily access that 
information. To enable meaningful information access, 
gatekeepers’ disclosure strategies should plan for how the 
information will reach communities.42 This means moving 
beyond posting documents online or including copies in 
distant administrative buildings. Effective strategies for 
information delivery include meetings, consultations, and 
dialogue processes with communities, who may need 
technical assistance in order to know what information to ask 
for. Enabling anonymous means of obtaining information, 
such as through radio broadcasts, can also increase 
information access in repressive or polarized settings. Efforts 
to ensure access also should be iterative for projects spanning 
long periods of time, as documents can easily be lost, 
especially if held by a community leader who passes away or 
whose formal term ends.43 
 
INFORMATION COMPREHENSION 
Communities that access disclosed information also need to 
be able to make sense of it. Enabling community 
comprehension of information entails converting raw data into 
information, adjusting it into an understandable form, and 
facilitating (and funding) access to other institutional supports 
needed to digest the information, such as technical assistance. 
In addition, sufficient time should be allowed for the 
community to digest the information, deliberate internally, and 
access technical support. A community member’s ability to 
understand information may depend on translation into local 
languages, having complex information summarized, and 
adjusting information to cultural and societal contexts. 
Challenges such as low literacy levels, a lack of previous 
experience with large-scale investment, and low legal 
knowledge must also be navigated (for instance, by using 
audiovisual media) or addressed (for instance, by facilitating 
independent legal education and empowerment).  
Gatekeepers should often bear the onus for enabling 
community comprehension. This includes demystifying both 
data and pathways for participation in decisions and redress. 
Technical documents also require explanation; for instance, a 
200-page management plan would need to be summarized 
and converted into a comprehensible form for community 
members (while also being disclosed in full for use by the 
community and its allies). 
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Examples of accessible, user-focused ways for gatekeepers to 
present complex information include: 
•       Plain language presentations and dialogue. 
•       Plain-language document summaries and annotations.44 
•       Visits to other projects that are either run by the 
company or otherwise comparable. 
•       Facilitating story sharing from other contexts, such as 
enabling communities to speak with, or receive video 
postcards from, other project-affected communities.45 
•       3D models and before-and-after images of the project’s 
likely impacts on the landscape.46 
 
OPEN PROCESSES AND INFORMATION USE  
A crucial element of transparency is the ability of communities, 
with support from their allies, to use information in order to 
influence decisions, hold actors to account, and pursue their 
own vision of development. This element has two parts. First, 
decision-making and governance systems must be open and 
accessible to communities. Second, communities must be 
able to effectively participate in and influence those processes 
and systems, which entails communities having the 
information, understanding, and, if needed, technical support 
to do so. Effective community participation in investment-
related decision-making and governance should be facilitated 
throughout the life cycle of an investment, as part of a self-
reinforcing loop of communication, participation in decisions, 
and accountability.  
Critical to enabling effective community participation in 
decision-making is timeliness. Communities too often receive 
information after important decisions have been made, or are 
not given enough time to properly digest and respond to 
information. Key moments for informed community use of 
information vary depending on factors such as applicable legal 
frameworks and how the project is financed. Communities 
need to be able to access information sufficiently in advance 
of such moments to be able to digest the information and 
respond accordingly. Some examples of key moments include: 
•       The adoption of relevant laws and policies concerning 
land investment. 
•       The zoning or earmarking of community lands for 
external investment. 
•       Initial expressions of interest in that land by potential 
investors. 
•       The undertaking of due diligence, impact assessments, 
and other preparatory studies for a proposed project.  
•       The negotiation of any agreements (including 
memoranda of understanding that are then used by 
companies to obtain finance) and the granting of every 
relevant authorization or permit. 
•       The implementation of the project, including any 
resettlement, compensation, and benefit sharing 
processes. 
•       The detection of any negative impacts, rights violations, 
or community grievances. 
•       The decision to terminate or wind-down the project. 
Yet community action will often not fit neatly into any one 
moment. Communities will have needs for information and for 
opportunities to influence decisions throughout the duration 
of any projects that proceed. Sometimes information use by 
communities and their allies take place in other, less definable, 
“moments,” such as when communities take steps to 
understand external demands for their lands and formulate 
community policies and protocols, or when they collaborate 
with civil society organizations on alternative, community-
driven models of development.47 
Community members and allies also reported using available 
information to inform and update government regulators and 
lenders. For example, communities and allies recounted that 
a regulatory agency would often welcome their efforts to 
inform it of company breaches of laws. Another civil society 
representative recalled discovering that a controversial dam 
project was financed, through an intermediary, by a DFI. That 
institution reportedly only found about local anger about the 
project, which was eventually abandoned, when the 
community brought a complaint under the lender’s 
accountability mechanism.  
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PART III 
GATEKEEPER INCENTIVES  
REGARDING TRANSPARENCY
Power affects the potential impact of any effort to improve governance and 
accountability. This is particularly true in the context of land investments, where 
immense power imbalances exist between communities and their allies, on the one 
hand, and gatekeepers on the other. Where political barriers exist, interventions can 
seek to:  
•       Navigate the existing political context and find openings for advancing LIT;  
•       Change the political context to remove barriers to the advancement of LIT; or  
•       Circumvent actors creating political barriers to the advancement of LIT and 
achieve desired results through other actors or means.48
Rice farming in central Madagascar. 
© Shutterstock/Pierre Jean Durieu.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT  |  17
TRANSPARENCY FOR WHOM? GROUNDING LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY IN THE NEEDS OF LOCAL ACTORS
This section sets out gatekeepers’ likely incentives and 
disincentives to understand where such barriers may lie. Where 
different gatekeepers’ incentives vary or conflict, the most 
powerful actors usually influence, if not control, ultimate 
outcomes. Of course, contexts vary tremendously and are also 
subject to change, making it impossible to universally pin 
down the incentives of different actors.49 Relatedly, institutions 
and the individuals within them may have differing incentives, 
further complicating the calculus. Nonetheless, a general 
understanding of likely motives can help to anticipate 
gatekeeper reactions to calls for the advancement of LIT and 
to identify especially fruitful avenues for improvement.  
 
HOST GOVERNMENTS 
Actors within government 
Restrictive attitudes to disclosure and to community 
participation in decision-making processes are more often 
attributed to entities that promote and facilitate land-based 
investment, including: investment promotion agencies; 
ministries of agriculture, forestry, and/or renewable energy; 
ministries of economy and finance; and special economic zone 
authorities, among others.50 Such actors’ incentives may align 
with those of the executive and heads of government, who 
may wish to use land investments to demonstrate their 
prowess in catalyzing development,51 to consolidate political 
control,52 or for personal enrichment.53 
Entities focused on environmental and social issues (such as 
ministries and agencies focused on environmental protection, 
justice, and human rights) may view LIT more favorably, as a 
tool to help them carry out their work.54 Parliamentarians, 
when acting in good faith and independently from ruling 
parties and the executive, may also view LIT as supporting their 
role as a check on executive power.55 
Local governments may see increased transparency as 
desirable if they are excluded from decisions concerning 
investment. However, local actors with concrete roles 
concerning investment may instead block the advancement of 
LIT,56 in which case national-level officials may be the ones 
insisting on transparency as a means of asserting some 
control.57 Where power is devolved to the chief level, 
customary leaders may also eschew transparency, negotiating 
privately with investors, even to the exclusion of government.58 
 
Differing conceptions of development 
Despite an international push for sustainability,59 top-down, 
macro-economic conceptions of development still seem to 
drive many government approaches to investment.60 National-
level government actors may view development in terms of 
raw numbers, and as being dependent on private-sector 
investments, potentially obscuring questions about land 
ownership and food security in the process.61 Investment may 
be seen an effective way to drive generation of gross domestic 
product, which governments may view as the primary measure 
of poverty eradication.62 Foreign investment also offers the 
prospect of increasing a country’s current account balance, 
reducing dependence on foreign credit and increasing access 
to foreign currency.63 Such actors may regard disclosure and 
informed community participation in decision-making 
processes as causing unnecessary transaction costs and 
delays;64 they may also dismiss mass resettlements, the over-
exploitation of water and forests, and the human rights 
violations that investments often cause as mere externalities 
that do not fundamentally alter the development calculus.65 
Actors following such approaches are eager to protect 
investors from undue scrutiny and to portray their country as 
having smooth investment approval processes.66 
 
Competition for power 
Interviewees in many countries viewed their heads of state and 
executive as controlling investment allocations. While contexts 
vary, this generally resulted in top-down, opaque decisions, from 
which communities were excluded.67 In Cameroon, for instance, 
strict executive control over investment approvals rendered 
subsequent requirements for consultations and impact 
assessment mere afterthoughts, stripping them of any real 
transformational potential.68 In Liberia, attempts were made to 
erode environmental regulators’ influence by referring decisions 
under such regulators’ purview to an inter-ministerial task force 
composed of institutions with no environmental mandate.69 
Struggles for power between government actors more 
generally can lead to poor transparency outcomes for many 
actors. Some agencies hoard information, forcing other 
officials to ask companies for documents such as concession 
contracts, or to rely on personal connections. Competition 
between public agencies and actors has also produced poor 
outcomes for investors,70 such as overlapping concessions 
awarded by different agencies.71 
Government actors’ power relationships with external actors 
can also have transparency impacts. Governments may argue 
that limiting information disclosure is a means of preserving 
strategic advantage during negotiations with incoming 
investors.72 Governments may also compete with other 
countries in attracting investment, which can incentivize races 
to the bottom concerning governance and transparency.73 
More generally, governments will often face geopolitical 
pressure, which can include pressure from other states 
interested in seeing certain investments proceed.74
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Corruption and patronage 
Opaque decision-making processes enable government actors 
to procure illicit personal benefits in exchange for approvals or 
favorable treatment.75 Unscrupulous actors with exclusive 
access to relevant information or decision-making processes 
may be incentivized to restrict community access, enabling 
them to secure illicit personal benefits or establish patron-client 
arrangements designed to accumulate or preserve control.76 
 
COMPANIES 
Actors within companies 
Different actors within companies will have different priorities 
and agendas, as well as varying abilities to achieve their 
intentions in practice. For instance, environmental and social 
specialists will often grasp the need for stable community 
relations but are often not involved in early processes in which 
key decisions are made. On the other hand, actors that control 
budget allocations and are charged with overall financial and 
operational management of projects may be less sensitized to 
community issues and more reluctant to change the status 
quo.77 A CEO’s personal interest in advancing transparency may 
be crucial to effecting transparency improvements across 
company operations. In other cases, company approaches to 
communities may vary, depending on each project’s individual 
manager. Regular staff turnover can also undermine 




Legal requirements are often a primary driver of company 
behavior concerning LIT.78 Legal risk (arising from failures to 
comply with legal requirements) can arise from the host 
country’s domestic law, from contractual relationships 
(including with lenders and insurers), and from companies’ 
home states.  
Legal risk may fail to motivate company action where there is 
a lack of meaningful consequences for company breaches of 
legal requirements. For instance, one civil society 
representative lamented the lack of “teeth” of the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC)’s disclosure requirements for its 
clients.79 Likewise, transparency requirements may be ignored 
or poorly implemented by local, politically connected 
companies, which may instead rely on their connections with 
powerful government officials to secure authorizations.80 Their 
political connections may also render them less concerned 
about the prospect of prosecution for criminal acts. 
Perceptions of legal risk may even incentivize unscrupulous 
companies to become less transparent. Companies may wish 
to preserve legal “grey areas” that they do not want resolved.81 
Alternatively, they may seek to avoid scrutiny of the company’s 
beneficial ownership, which can expose techniques such as 
transfer mispricing or the use of shadow companies to obtain 
certification where the parent company remains uncertified 
and unaccountable.82  
 
Operational and financial risk 
Land-based investments face significant risks linked to tenure 
and community relations. The grievances of communities who 
were excluded or suffered adverse impacts, whose legitimate 
tenure rights were ignored, or whose expectations were not 
fulfilled, can transform into conflict, costly interruptions to 
production, legal challenges, stranded assets, and termination 
or abandonment.83 Community grievances have also led to the 
revocation of host government authorizations.84 Investing in 
local engagement processes and two-way communication, 
obtaining free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), and 
establishing grievance mechanisms have been revealed as 
crucial tools to mitigate the risks of costly community conflict.85 
Many industry representatives interviewed concurred, 
although almost all preferred to speak about information 
sharing and dialogue rather than FPIC. One former 
agribusiness representative viewed conflict with a local 
community as “tak[ing] up a lot of energy and oxygen and 
tak[ing] away from other aspects of the business,” echoing 
evidence from the mining sector.86 Meaningful, two-way 
communication enables companies to adequately respond to 
community concerns, while robust grievance mechanisms can 
enable communities to channel their frustration through 
productive, non-adversarial processes, rather than resorting 
to litigation. 
Interviewees also viewed informed community participation 
in decision-making processes as helping companies to 
effectively: 
•       Manage legacy issues around land ownership. This 
helped avoid perpetuating “confusion and resentment, 
passed on from generation to generation.”87 
•       Strengthen company access to and control of land. 
Companies who disclose information about their right to 
operate can demonstrate the bounds of their entitlement 
to lands, reducing the risk of conflicting land claims.88 
•       Stabilize smallholder supply. Companies may improve 
LIT as part of their efforts to encourage collaborative 
business relationships and partnerships with small-scale 
producers.89
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Reputational risk 
Some companies care about how they are perceived, both 
externally (by investors, buyers, regulators, competitors, and 
consumers) and internally (by employees).90 They may 
therefore be open to improving their transparency practices to 
avoid having their reputations tarnished by allegations of rights 
violations or negative impacts. Yet reputation can also 
motivate companies to act more opaquely. Interviewees from 
civil society, a DFI, and an agribusiness acknowledged that 
companies might view additional transparency as increasing 
their vulnerability to damaging advocacy campaigns. This has 
the potential to cause a vicious cycle, where practices that 
exclude communities from decision-making lead to fallout that 
then discourages company representatives from being more 
transparent in the future.  
 
Profit and cost  
Companies’ pursuit of profit and desire to save costs can be used 
to argue both for or against enhancing disclosure and 
community participation in decision-making processes.91 For 
instance, a company could refuse to expand its community 
engagement program in the name of cutting costs, but that could 
ultimately increase the risk of community conflict that can have 
significant financial costs.92 Likewise, companies may access new 
markets by complying with certification schemes that themselves 
require various elements of LIT. Nonetheless, various private 
sector interviewees noted that companies do view LIT as 
resource intensive without guaranteeing a project’s success.  
 
LENDERS AND EQUITY INVESTORS 
Actors within lenders and equity investors 
Like companies, lenders and equity investors comprise actors 
with varying degrees of sensitization to community issues, and 




Conflict and grievances caused or facilitated by failures to ensure 
informed community participation in decision-making increase 
the chances of legal claims and formal grievances being brought 
against both companies93 and their investors.94 These have led 
to investors making financial settlements with communities. 
Increased LIT can both head off potential claims and also act as 
early warning signals for lenders and investors, enabling them to 
take action before grievances escalate to litigation. 
Financial risk 
Some lenders and investors perceive informed community 
participation in decision-making processes as improving 
operational risk management for the project. This is important, 
as operational risk for companies translates to financial risk for 
lenders (who seek to obtain interest on their loans) and for 
equity investors (who seek to maximize the return on their 
investment by increasing company value or income). The desire 
of lenders and investors to avoid project failure and costly delays 
can motivate them to require improved LIT of their investees.95 
High-profile community conflict has also led to divestment 
campaigns, causing financial institutions to lose major 
institutional and individual customers.96 In addition, fall out 
linked to community opposition has been linked to reduced 
stock prices for publicly listed entities.97 Investor decisions to 
withdraw from projects create administrative and exit costs, and 
uncertainty for equity investors wishing to divest if no new buyer 
can be found.98 Finally, lenders and investors may find 
themselves on the hook to remediate rights violations.99 
 
Reputational risk 
Related to financial risks, lenders and investors are sensitive 
to negative publicity, which can affect perceptions from future 
investees and customers.100 This can create a general aversion, 
though not always, to irresponsible projects that can explode 
into international media stories and complaints. Many 
investors increasingly wish to bolster their reputations for 
diligent screening and monitoring.101 
 
Industry trends 
Certain lenders and investors may also take cues from leading 
actors on best practice. Here, the lead of DFIs, whose mandates 
include advancing development, can help sensitize other 
investors of the value in requiring informed community 
participation in decision-making processes. For example, a 
manager from an emerging market financial institution viewed 
access to finance from DFIs as a big motivator for their 
adoption of improved community engagement practices. 
Likewise, a representative from an asset manager noted that 
private sector investors were often more “fluent” in issues like 
deforestation and climate change than in land-related or social 
measures, indicating the need for DFI leadership on 
community-facing issues. 
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PART IV 
WHAT RISKS CAN LAND INVESTMENT  
TRANSPARENCY INTRODUCE?
While land investment transparency holds the potential for better governance and 
accountability, empowered communities, and the mitigation of social conflict, 
increased transparency may also pose certain risks, which should be factored into 
interventions and approaches. 
Planting cassava, Asia.  
© Shutterstock/PimjanPhoto. 
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RISKS OF LAND LOSS 
In certain cases, increased information about communities 
and their lands may heighten the risks that communities could 
lose control of those lands.102 Actors seeking land may be 
attracted to areas where information about land holdings and 
titles is easily accessible.103 Where formalization of community 
land rights is done incrementally, gatekeepers may also 
disingenuously claim that lands not yet titled are impliedly the 
sole domain of the government—rather than acknowledging 
that the processes of formally titling community lands are in 
progress.104 In addition, increased knowledge of the value and 
features of lands held by women and marginalized community 
groups may increase the risk of powerful community elites 
appropriating such lands—whether for themselves or to 
allocate to investors.105 
These risks of land loss reinforce the importance of conceiving 
of transparency not only as disclosure, but also as including 
informed and empowered community participation in 
decision-making. The risks also highlight why transparency is 
best viewed as a complement to broader reforms and efforts, 
such as legal empowerment and the recognition and respect 
of legitimate tenure rights.
RISKS TO COMMUNITY MEMBERS 
Information requests and participation in decision-making 
processes by communities can also introduce risks to 
community members, especially in repressive contexts with 
limited civic space. Community members and allies who seek 
to access information or advocate for community perspectives 
to be included in decisions may become targets for retaliation 
and criminalization. For instance, recent research highlights 
that more than one third of recorded attacks on human rights 
defenders in 2020 stemmed from failures to consult, or obtain 
the FPIC of, communities.106 This risk illustrates the need to 
avoid relying on “decontextualized ‘best practices’”107 and to 
instead design and adapt transparency interventions to the 
relevant context. 
Harvesting tea, Kenya. © Shutterstock/Jen Watson. 
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PART V 
CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED BY  
COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ALLIES
This section sets out various common challenges experienced by communities and 
their allies relating to disclosure and information access, comprehension, and use. 
Such challenges are often the result of gatekeeper incentives playing out in practice. 
These challenges can limit communities’ ability to knowledgably influence decisions 
about investments and the governance of their lands and resources, and, ultimately, 
to protect their rights and drive their own sustainable development.  
 
DISCLOSURE CHALLENGES 
Information is not disclosed early enough 
The timing of information sharing remains a significant challenge for enabling informed 
community participation in decisions. Communities need information to be disclosed 
sufficiently in advance of key moments when decisions will be made in order to digest 
that information, convene communally to identify priorities, and prepare to influence 
Tea plantation worker.  
© Shutterstock/tonkid. 
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decisions.108 Information asymmetries will usually exist before 
disclosure, with gatekeepers controlling to a large degree 
whether or not communities are even aware that a project has 
been proposed. This asymmetry demonstrates the need for 
proactive disclosure, to alert communities of a potential project 
and enable them to begin preparations. In addition to examples 
of communities not hearing about a project until bulldozers 
arrive on their lands,109 gatekeepers regularly fail to provide 
communities with all relevant information sufficiently in 
advance of key decision-making moments. For example, even 
those governments and companies that eventually publish 
copies of investor-state contracts tend to engage in minimal, if 
any, information sharing about the negotiation process before 
the contract is signed.110 
 
Some information is never disclosed 
In some cases, communities never find out the terms 
governing an investment project. For instance, in Cameroon, 
communities affected by plantations established in the 1960s 
and 70s still have not obtained copies of applicable investor-
state contracts, despite a national law requiring disclosure of 
all natural resource investment contracts.111 Likewise, civil 
society interviewees recounted examples where they 
uncovered that impact assessments had not been conducted 
after spending years requesting such documents. 
In addition to breaching community rights to information, 
gatekeeper refusals to disclose information can introduce new 
risks for communities. For instance, communities and allies 
may resort to informal and covert avenues to obtain 
information,112 which introduce additional risks of reprisals, 
concerns about accuracy, and challenges for keeping abreast 
of new developments. 
 
A lack of proactive disclosure puts burdens on communities 
The above failures by gatekeepers to proactively disclose 
information put the burden on communities and their allies to 
obtain relevant information before key decisions are made. 
This hinders communities’ ability to understand what is at 
stake and to influence key decisions. Putting the onus on 
communities to seek out information also creates demands in 
terms of cost, time, and effort. Strategies employed by 
communities and their allies to obtain information that was 
not proactively disclosed include: 
•        Making formal information requests to government under 
right to information or freedom of information laws,113 and 
purchasing documents from public agencies.114 
•       Asking companies and other non-governmental 
information-holders for information, often with reference 
to community members’ rights to information, principles 
of natural justice, or lender access-to-information 
policies.115 (Other research has revealed a concerning 
trend of companies refusing information requests by civil 
society organizations acting on behalf of communities, 
which creates additional costs for communities who 
have to seek out the information themselves.116) 
•       Directly observing activities or impacts.117 
These measures are not always possible in certain contexts, 
including where civic space is under attack and where 
defenders face criminalization and reprisals.  
 
Disclosed information may be inaccurate, fueling 
“information wars” 
When gatekeepers disclose information, there may be doubts as 
to its accuracy or completeness.118 In extreme cases, misleading 
or false information may be shared as part of what one civil society 
representative called an “information war.” One community 
member interviewed reported having to pay a government entity 
for maps of mining concessions, and receiving maps it believed 
the entity knew were out of date and inaccurate. These challenges 
can further increase the amount of time needed for communities 
to fully understand what is at stake and determine how they can 
participate in decisions that have not been made. 
 
ACCESS CHALLENGES 
Information, when disclosed, often remains inaccessible 
Where governments or companies do disclose documents and 
other relevant information, these can remain out of reach for 
communities. In some countries, for example, forestry 
conventions are often published in hard copy in government 
gazettes; these are only accessible in faraway government 
buildings, unless unearthed by civil society actors who can 
identify which of hundreds of gazette volumes contains the 
relevant document. Communities and allies interviewed also 
relied on media reports,119 online repositories of documents 
administered by governments120 or other actors,121 and 
company websites;122 though communities will often require 
external support to be able to access such information sources. 
 
Decision-makers are inaccessible 
If communities want to influence relevant decisions, then 
access to decision-makers within government, companies, and 
investment chain actors is crucial. But communities often face 
challenges in locating decision-makers. One community 
representative, for example, said they could only access a 
company’s local managers, making it harder to develop 
working relationships with other company representatives who 
might have the power to improve the company’s community 
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engagement practices. Another community representative said 
it was so difficult to find government decision-makers who were 
adequately informed about an infrastructure project that 
communities could not obtain consistent and reliable 
information; this led to confusion about how the project would 
affect them and whether or not they were entitled to participate 
in decision-making concerning the project. 
The way that a project is financed can also introduce barriers 
to accessing decision-makers in investment chains. For 
instance, communities can struggle to identify project lenders 
and inform them about local challenges when finance is 











Communities often start with a low understanding of their 
rights and other legal issues 
Communities often do not start with a detailed understanding 
of legal issues, which puts them at a disadvantage in claiming 
their land and human rights, and in knowing what information 
they are entitled to, how to get it, and how to participate in 
decision-making. The law is often complex and inaccessible. 
Different actors’ rights and responsibilities, and investment-
related decision-making processes, are derived not only from 
constitutions and laws, but also from contracts, permits, and 
other documents. Many of these sources are often not publicly 
accessible, and communities may struggle to understand how 
different sources interact. Confusion relating to overlaps in 
customary and formal laws can also be exploited by gatekeepers 
to further discourage empowered community action. 
“Poverty cannot be eliminated by people  
who stay in their offices.” 
— Community member 
Source: International Accountability Project (IAP), Back to development: A call 
for what development could be (2015), 81. 
 “ I can hear a chainsaw but how do I know if it’s legal?” 
– Community member 
Source: Project Completion Report - Making the Forest Sector Transparent,  
Global Witness (2013) 
 
“[The land law] gives communities the power  
but they don’t understand” 
– Community member, Kenya123  
Disclosed information is hard to understand 
Communities will generally struggle to read and digest technical 
documents spanning hundreds or thousands of pages. More 
generally, communities without experience of large-scale 
investment projects may struggle to grasp the implications of a 
proposed project. Community and civil society representatives 
reported a strong need for technical information to be 
summarized and made easier to understand.124 Incoming 
investment projects can also increase confusion about 
community members’ land rights, as governments may change 
how land is categorized to facilitate investments.125 Circumstances 
can also change—such as authorizations either expiring or being 
renewed—without communities being updated.126 
 
INFORMATION USE (AND BROADER GOVERNANCE) 
CHALLENGES 
Governments privilege company information over 
community information and make poor decisions 
Governments tend to prioritize information provided by 
companies to the detriment of information generated by 
communities.127 This is problematic, as data is never neutral; 
control and access to data brings with it “tremendous political 
and ideological power.”128 Even map data can be manipulated 
by the entity doing the mapping.129 If companies control what 
will be measured, and how, they can influence how information 
is portrayed and shape narratives in their favor. Poor decisions 
are more likely to be made when community information, which 
can signpost the risk of social conflict,130 is ignored.  
One civil society interviewee lamented that information 
collected and provided by communities is “discounted” 
because of assumptions that the community will be self-
interested. That same interviewee expressed frustration that 
company consultants are assumed to act with more 
objectivity, referring to a case where consultants erroneously 
concluded that land was “unoccupied and infertile” despite 
obvious indications of community occupation and use.  
 
Regulators often neglect their mandate 
Many relevant government regulators, such as national level 
ministries, often do not maintain regular presences at project sites, 
and therefore rely on information being shared with them by 
companies, rather than robust monitoring and enforcement.131 This 
can result in government agencies acting as “absentee regulators,” 
ones that are often unaware of how projects are proceeding until 
local unrest makes headlines. Relying on information produced by 
the entity that is being regulated indicates a breakdown of 
transparency and accountability. While the impediments to active 
regulation may be framed in terms of resource and personnel 
shortages, in practice these are often the result of political choices.132 
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Good faith regulators are undermined 
Government regulators that seek to enable the sharing of 
information with communities to enable their participation in 
investment-related decision-making often face pressure and 
pushback from more powerful actors. Such actors may be willing 
to exert influence to advance the investment at any cost. For 
instance, one Central African government interviewee recounted 
recommending against approving mining in a particular area and 
receiving death threats from a mining company, which was 
connected to the Prime Minister. In another instance, a former 
head of an environmental agency in West Africa was reportedly 
sidelined after measuring a mine’s environmental impacts; they 
also described being pressured from a “higher office” to “play 
ball” after making a finding that a high-profile agribusiness 
plantation violated environmental regulations. In such 
circumstances, the ability of good faith regulators to fulfill their 
mandates, which can include enforcing obligations for 
information sharing and participatory processes, is often limited. 
 
Communities do not control whether or not a project takes 
place 
Communities are still usually viewed as being subject to 
decisions concerning investment, rather than as having rights 
to decide whether or not a project can take place and, if so, on 
what terms. The international rights of Indigenous and tribal 
peoples to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)133 are often 
still elusive in practice. Likewise, international recognition of 
the need to respect legitimate tenure rights,134 which include 
undocumented customary rights to lands and resources, 
remains, in many cases, an aspiration rather than reality.  
While courts or ombudsmen have recognized community 
rights to FPIC in various contexts,135 many governments 
continue to use public purpose expropriations to make way for 
investment, or otherwise award concessions before engaging 
communities.136 Companies and lenders have proven similarly 
resistant to FPIC. Even companies that understand the 
importance of stable community relations tend to prefer 
consultations to FPIC.137 The IFC has also restrictively 
interpreted application of its FPIC standard, applying it in less 
than 2% of its entire portfolio.138 
In rare cases, however, grievance procedures have led to 
companies deferring to community rejections of projects. For 
 “[Companies] do not ask for your ideas,  
they just come and inform you.” 
— Community member 
Source: IAP, Back to development:  
A call for what development could be (2015), 82
example, community grievances issued through the Office of 
Accountability of the former Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) led to the suspension of construction of 
Mexico’s Cerro de Oro Dam.139 Likewise, a Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) grievance led Olam Gabon to 
commit to not using land within its formal concession where 
community landholders refused.140 
 
Information and participation can be used by gatekeepers 
to dampen pressure for systemic change 
While open and participatory processes are needed to enable 
communities to obtain and use information, experts have 
warned of the risks of viewing participation, especially at the 
project level, as a “magic elixir.”141 Gatekeepers may cede to 
demands for increased community participation as part of a 
strategy to deflate pressure for deeper institutional changes, such 
as formal recognition of Indigenous territories or alternative, 
community-driven development approaches.142 Participatory 
processes like consultations may therefore convert communities’ 
political demands (for instance, to control their lands and 
development) into less transformational procedural ones (for 
instance, for disclosure and inclusion in decisions). When 
communities are opposed to a project, such procedures create 
forums for, at best, contestation and communication: more often, 
they enable the further domination of communities by powerful 
companies,143 and debilitate legitimate community opposition.144 
Having snuffed out pressure for structural change, governments 
can simply multiply project-level participatory processes while 
ensuring those processes remain disconnected from national 
policy debates or formal accountability mechanisms.145 Exclusion 
from the policy level in turn limits the boundaries and scope of 
what communities can secure through project-level participatory 
channels.146 These dynamics reveal the limitations, and even 
risks, of focusing on information and project-level participation.  
 
Existing initiatives privilege elite perspectives, rarely 
meeting community needs 
The experience of existing initiatives with transparency and 
governance components show that communities’ 
transparency needs are unlikely to be met unless communities 
are defined as a primary beneficiary of such initiatives. 
Initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) and the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and 
Trade (FLEGT) program, both analyzed in detail below, have 
led to the release of flurries of data, with the intention of 
animating citizen, civil society, and/or commodity buyer use 
of such information. The focus on this broad set of 
beneficiaries means that these initiatives often fail to enable 
communities to better access, understand, and use 
information in open decision-making processes and systems.  
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BOX 2: THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched in 2002 as a narrow set of rules focused on revenue 
transparency in the extractives sector. Since then, EITI has evolved into a global standard implemented by over 50 
countries. It is a multi-stakeholder initiative that now requires the disclosure of contracts, license allocations, beneficial 
ownership data, and social and economic spending by the private sector, among others, with the aim to “promote open 
and accountable management of extractive resources.”147 EITI was created at a time when investigative journalism, 
campaigning, and academic literature had brought natural resource management issues to the fore. EITI received high-
level support from the G8 countries, donors and development banks, although oil companies initially argued against 
company reporting.148 EITI responded to company concerns by designing the initiative as a level playing field, where all 
companies operating in a particular country were required to make the same disclosures.149 Though challenges remain, 
EITI has undoubtedly facilitated a “deep normative shift”150 around extractives sector data disclosure.  
The evolution of the EITI standard demonstrates how initiatives can build the normative basis for increased disclosure 
over time, starting with a narrow set of rules that can generate buy in, which are then progressively developed into a 
more comprehensive set of requirements. NGOs have been instrumental in the evolution of the standard, and have 
used EITI to initiate broader discussions on transparency and accountability in the extractives sector in different 
countries. Scholars have found that successful strategies to broaden the scope of EITI can be attributed to a “layering 
technique” that takes small but deliberate steps toward expanding reporting requirements.151 
 
Participation and influence: Who has a seat at the table?  
The creation of multi-stakeholder groups (MSGs) in each participating country to oversee implementation of the EITI 
standard has led to increased participation of civil society in extractives-related policy discussions at the national and 
international level. In some countries, MSGs have facilitated unprecedented access for civil society to engage with 
government and the private sector.152 In addition, some NGOs working at the national level have rallied around the EITI 
standard to build regional and international networks. Certain better-networked local organizations have also been able 
to use their participation to increase their influence at the domestic level and their access to international funding.153 
While MSGs have facilitated greater civil society participation in extractives governance, EITI tends to be viewed as an 
elite platform that only well-resourced and “professionalized” CSOs can engage with.154 Civil society platforms have 
been created in some countries to facilitate participation of more diverse groups.155 But investment-affected 
communities—including community leaders who, unlike CSOs, have formal mandates to represent and be accountable 
to their constituents—are still excluded from MSGs.156 As a result, disclosure or other transparency gains at the EITI 
may be less informed by, or likely to align with, community needs.  
 
Impact 
EITI has led to more extractives sector data being made publicly available. The effective use of the data by citizens to 
achieve broader goals remains a challenge, however: there is insufficient evidence, for example, that EITI has led to 
significant improvements in governance and accountability in countries where it is implemented.157 
Lessons from the EITI experience suggest that, in order for future land transparency initiatives to contribute to better 
governance, multiple strands of work should be pursued in parallel, focused on efforts that increase data use, open 
decision-making processes, and government responsiveness. In order to do this, the politics that underlie the citizen-
state relationship must be well understood,158 and the following questions interrogated: What pathways to 
accountability exist within a given context? What motivates citizens to organize in a given context? What obstacles do 
they face? And how do governments respond? 
This textbox was written by Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye. 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT  |  27
TRANSPARENCY FOR WHOM? GROUNDING LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY IN THE NEEDS OF LOCAL ACTORS
BOX 3: THE EU FOREST LAW ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNANCE AND TRADE (FLEGT) PROGRAM
The European Union (EU) Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) program is an international multi-
stakeholder effort whose emphasis on governance has been accompanied by a strong emphasis on forestry sector 
information disclosure.159 
FLEGT establishes arrangements between the European Union and timber-producing countries that seek to address 
illegal logging in line with the EU’s 2013 Timber Regulation. The key components of FLEGT are Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements (VPAs) — legally binding bilateral trade agreements between the EU and individual timber-producing host 
countries. Each VPA establishes standards for the “legality” of timber produced, and accompanying host country 
mechanisms to enforce those standards. Some also have annexes that set out disclosure requirements. VPAs and 
“legality” definitions vary by country. Each VPA starts with existing host country law as its foundation. The EU and the 
host country then agree upon a law reform process, which typically results in reforms that align with EU expectations 
of “legality.”160 Once monitoring systems and reforms are implemented and audited, the VPA progresses to a regime 
where only licensed product, verified as compliant with host country law, can be exported to the EU.161 
While VPAs focus heavily on legality, compliance is primarily encouraged through financial incentives in the form of 
access to the EU market.162 To build pressure for compliance with national law, FLEGT also provides technical and 
financial resources to support multi-stakeholder processes and improve monitoring by government and, in some 
countries, CSOs.163 
FLEGT has achieved some success. Encouragingly, seven countries have signed VPAs with the EU and another nine 
are currently in negotiations,164 which reportedly involve diverse coalitions representing both powerful and some 
disadvantaged parties.165 In addition, the VPAs create binding obligations on host countries to more effectively regulate 
timber production.166 The OpenTimberPortal, established to capitalize on FLEGT-related document disclosure by timber 
producers, has published substantial amounts of project-related documents and contracts from a range of Central 
African countries.167 
FLEGT has also been subject to various evidence-based criticisms. Noted shortcomings include: its onerous compliance 
mechanisms and barriers to participation by small-scale producers;168 broad producer noncompliance;169 host 
government failures to honor transparency commitments and guarantee improved rights-holder participation in 
investment-related decision-making;170 low access to information;171 corruption-prone verification mechanisms;172 and 
a failure to establish lasting licensing regimes to certify compliance.173 
FLEGT’s shortcomings have been attributed to its overreliance on market forces and to pre-existing incentives within 
EU and host government bureaucracies, which often prioritize quick and demonstrable results over substantive 
change.174 FLEGT has even been described as a “fad,” one of many fleeting initiatives that attract significant donor 
resources and attention but then succumb to bureaucratic ambivalence in the absence of immediate results.175 One 
critic has asserted that state consolidation and a myopic reliance upon definitions of legality have not only failed to 
improve governance, but may in fact be exacerbating inequalities by favoring elite actors.176 
Of course, attributing these shortcomings to FLEGT alone ignores the broader context in which VPAs are signed. Most 
host countries face intractable social and economic inequalities and political challenges, which FLEGT is not designed, 
nor equipped, to resolve. While researchers have identified several strategies for improving the program, such as 
expanding access to program data,177 FLEGT’s success will likely continue to be limited by structural factors beyond its 
scope. A continuing failure to ground FLEGT’s transparency requirements in the needs of local communities will also 
likely limit FLEGT’s potential to bolster community information access and participation in decision-making and 
forestry governance.  
This textbox was written by William Sommer and Sam Szoke-Burke.  
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PART VI 
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES: STRATEGIES TO 
ADVANCE MORE EFFECTIVE LAND INVESTMENT 
This section explores ways to improve disclosure and access, comprehension, and/or 
use of information by community members as empowered participants in open 
decision-making processes and governance systems.  
These strategies and approaches need to be adjusted to—and their appropriateness 
will depend on—the local context,178 taking into consideration potential risks to 
community members and their lands (see Part IV, above).  
The ideas highlighted will often need to be paired with other important interventions, 
such as enhancing community legal literacy and improving access to justice, in order 
to empower communities to claim rights, hold others to account, and effect 
important changes to relevant governance systems.179
Small-scale agriculture, Morocco. 
© Shutterstock/monticello. 
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Each strategy and approach’s potential for impact will be 
affected by the likelihood of resistance from gatekeepers,180 or 
by the potential to decouple relevant gatekeepers’ influence or 
control from such solutions.181 Most of the suggested strategies 
and approaches are therefore accompanied with insights into 
how gatekeepers might respond.  
 
1. DRIVING AGENDAS WITH COMMUNITY-LED PROCESSES 
Communities can set the agenda for transparency by 
articulating how decisions should be made concerning their 
lands, resources, and development.182 Specific tools for 
communities to set agendas include autonomous protocols,183 
community bylaws,184 and community-led development 
plans.185 These tools can be used to set clear expectations 
regarding information sharing, time and support needed, and 
how communities expect to be involved in decision-making. 
More broadly, protocols, bylaws and development plans can 
articulate community priorities concerning self-determination, 
the management of lands and resources, customary decision-












Community agenda-setting may be needed precisely because 
communities often are not proactively provided with 
information and afforded opportunities to participate in 
decision-making. These transparency shortcomings are often 
caused by government reluctance to recognize community 
rights to control their lands and resources, such as FPIC and 
legitimate tenure rights. Instead, governments restrict 
information sharing and opportunities for community 
participation to preserve governmental control over land 
allocation. For example, governments may focus consultations 
on the question of compensation, rather than on whether or 
not the communities consent to the land being taken. The legal 
status of protocols, bylaws and development plans, and the 
prospects of gatekeepers respecting them, may vary. 
Nonetheless, this proactive step can build pressure for 
community inclusion in investment-related decision-making, 
and strategically position communities for follow-up responses 
where their demands are ignored.
“… the consultation protocol serves as an instrument to 
give strength… to say we have the right to be consulted in 
this way, in this timeframe… it is not you who decides who 
is coming to our villages. We decide.” 
— Indigenous leader from Brazil 
Source: Mebratu-Tsegaye, T., and Kazemi, L., Free, prior and informed 
consent: Addressing political realities to improve impact, CCSI (2020), 24
Gatekeeper insights 
While governments and companies will usually continue to resist 
community demands for the right to decide whether or not 
projects take place, protocols, bylaws, and development plans 
may be welcomed to the extent that they help gatekeepers 
navigate the complex social conditions of local communities. 
Even if gatekeepers resist deferring to community decisions 
concerning proposed investments, having protocols, bylaws, or 
development plans may help open up space to discuss how to 
meaningfully feed community insights into ultimate decisions.  
2. INCREASING TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITIES 
Technical support—from local allies, civil society, and other 
experts—is often crucial to enabling communities to access 
and understand information and to knowledgably influence 
decisions relating to land investments. Types of support often 
needed include legal empowerment, help obtaining early 
information about projects,186 and support in identifying 
lenders, equity investors and insurers linked to projects.187 
Technical support can also help communities: develop 
protocols, bylaws, and development plans; navigate 
consultations, negotiations, and other processes; and more 
effectively pursue grievances or seek redress.188 
An important part of community support to help access, 
understand, and use information is the question how such 
support is funded. Given the vast numbers of project-
affected communities around the world and the limited 
resources of philanthropic and aid donors, new forms of 
funding are needed to enhance community access to 
support. The private sector can be a supplementary source 
of funding. For instance, resource companies have directly 
paid for lawyers189 and anthropologists190 to support 
communities, and for facilitators and training to help 
address resolve ongoing conflict.191 The RSPO’s Principles 
and Criteria also require member companies to ensure that 
“FPIC is obtained...with option of resourced access to 
independent advice.”192 Yet direct company funding 
introduces the risk of actual or perceived undue influence 
by the company over the community or its support provider. 
A “basket fund” approach, where multiple companies and 
other actors pay into an independently-administered facility 
that finances community technical assistance, would help 
to increase community access to support while managing 
the risk of undue influence.193 By increasing community 
access to support, a basket fund could help enhance 
information access, comprehension, and use in investment-
related decision-making.
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Gatekeeper insights 
Increasing community access to technical support cuts both 
ways for companies. While companies are wary of facilitating 
the entrance of campaigners who bring the prospect of naming 
and shaming, some companies regard community technical 
support as crucial to inform interactions, set realistic 
expectations, and build cooperative relationships between 
communities and companies. 
Several resource company representatives saw a basket fund 
for community technical assistance as a good idea. But they 
anticipated challenges in actually securing financial 
contributions from companies in the absence of binding 
requirements, such as loan conditions or performance 
standards. Governments may also resist such an effort if they 
perceive it as threatening their control over the conduct of 
investment;194 involving government—in an appropriate way—
in planning for a basket fund may help to mitigate such risks. 
3. EMPOWERING GOOD FAITH REGULATORS  
Communities’ ability to access and understand information and 
influence decisions can be bolstered by empowering good faith 
regulators and other “reformers” within government. Because 
such actors often face political barriers to carrying out their 
mandates, efforts to empower them must be politically attuned, 
rather than focusing solely on skill development. Lessons from 
previous attempts at reforming captured sectors reveal that 
good faith actors’ influence can be bolstered by linking them 
with other credible actors within government and strategic allies 
beyond government, such as civil society, the private sector, 
religious groups and academia. Such alliances can boost 
regulators’ legitimacy or increase their collective influence, 
helping to overcome resistance by reluctant gatekeepers.195 
 
4. IMPLEMENTING MULTI-STAKEHOLDER AND 
PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES  
Multi-stakeholder processes—which involve a combination of 
communities, allies, companies, government, and other 
actors—can create new avenues for communities to obtain 
relevant information, share their perspectives, and seek to 
understand and influence decision-makers. While all solutions 
come with risks for communities, the risks attached to multi-
stakeholder processes deserve particularly careful 
consideration. Such processes can increase the risk of attacks 
against participating community representatives, who may 
draw attention to themselves when voicing grievances, making 
demands, or advocating for potential action.  
 
Dialogue processes 
Dialogues involve having regular meetings among 
stakeholders, and may be implemented at the project-, 
landscape-, or national level. Communities can use dialogues 
to request and obtain information, share their perspectives 
with gatekeepers, build trust, understand different actors’ 
goals and motivations. Dialogues can also be a vehicle for 
communities to use information to influence decisions and 
peacefully resolve grievances.196 
Multi-stakeholder dialogues can also bring various challenges. 
Dialogues may introduce new political spaces for community 
elites to occupy, further marginalizing grassroots perspectives. 
Elite community members tasked with both representing all 
community members and faithfully reporting back to them 
may instead seek to accumulate personal benefits and 
influence. For this reason, dialogues should act in coordination 
with community-wide meetings or consultations, rather than 
replacing them. In addition, dialogues may replicate existing 
power imbalances and be subject to domination by 
gatekeepers.197 Dialogues can also result in frustration if they 
do not lead to improved outcomes.198 An emphasis on 
empowered participation by community representatives, 
including in deciding on the norms and processes that govern 
the dialogue, is therefore critical. The presence of impartial 
actors from civil society and reputable public institutions may 












Joint inspections, monitoring, and fact-finding 
The co-production of data by communities, allies and 
gatekeepers—whether through joint inspections, monitoring 
or fact-finding relating to community grievances—may help 
increase community access to information and informed 
community participation in decision-making. Joint processes 
can correct misleading or inaccurate information, fill evidence 
gaps, and build trust and shared understandings between 
actors.202 Crucial to the co-production of data is what happens 
to it afterwards: communities must have equal access to the 
data they help produce, rather than enabling the “extraction” 
of such data from communities.203 
Gatekeeper insights 
While companies are often willing to participate in dialogues, their 
objectives in doing so can deeply affect outcomes. While 
“performative” and controlling approaches are unlikely to lead to 
meaningful dialogue and change,200 companies participating as 
part of a commitment to strong community relations may enable 
more transformative outcomes for participating communities.201  
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Gatekeeper insights 
Joint fact-finding has been financed by individual companies204 
and facilitated by lender-linked grievance mechanisms,205 
indicating some gatekeeper openness. In other instances, 
however, companies have instead resisted community entry to 
project areas.206 One civil society interviewee reported that 
regulators have agreed to joint inspections, but only for smaller 
and less politically connected projects.  
5. FACTORING COMMUNITY-GENERATED INFORMATION 
INTO INVESTMENT-RELATED DECISIONS 
While transparency efforts often focus on information 
produced by powerful actors, information generation by 
communities and their allies has transformative potential—for 
communities and land governance more generally.207 
Communities producing their own information can feed local 
perspectives into decision-making and governance processes, 
and highlight deliberately under-examined impacts. This can 
help communities to break gatekeepers’ control over the 
information upon which decisions are made.208  
Community information-generation can take different shapes, 
including: 
•       Mapping community lands and resources. 
•       Monitoring—for illegal activities209 and adverse impacts 
of investments.210 
•       Community-led human rights impact assessments of 
investment projects.211 
•       Community-led surveys concerning proposed or current 
investments.212 
Community information generation can reinforce community 
autonomy by increasing gatekeepers’ understanding of the 
significance of Indigenous peoples’ and other communities’ 
relationships with lands and ecosystems213 and their ability to 
manage and monitor lands.214 Generating data may also help 
communities to shape narratives around how ecosystems and 
resources should be used, and to advance community-centric 
approaches to land use. 
 “ [W]e have decided to watch over our lands and forests,  
and to get organised to collect and publish information  
to tell the world what is going on.”  
— Chairperson of the South Rupununi District Council, 
Guyana, 2017 
Source: Wagnon, J, “Closing the Gap: Rights-based solutions for tackling 
deforestation,” Forest Peoples Programme (FPP), Feb. 15, 2018.
Community information can also produce significant 
governance outcomes. It can reveal rights violations that are 
not being addressed by the company or known by the 
government or the company’s investors.215 Communities have 
therefore responded to government reliance on company data 
by calling for processes like environmental and social impact 
assessments to include consideration of community-
generated information.216 Community information can also 
help to check inaccurate or misleading information,217 and 
resolve factual disputes by filling evidence gaps with crucial 
local information.218
 “ If the company had surveyed even one local person, they 
would have known about the importance of the spring 
before they put a waste dump on this spot.” 
— Community member 
Source: IAP, Back to development: A call for what development could be 
(2015), 84.
Gatekeeper insights 
Government representatives are sometimes willing to access 
community-generated information and such information may 
help justify findings by good faith regulators regarding deficient 
participatory processes. Nonetheless, gatekeepers within 
government may resist any proposal to require them to 
incorporate such information into decisions.  
Some companies may already factor in community-generated 
information. For instance, one mining company—albeit in a 
jurisdiction with strong protections of Indigenous rights—is 
contractually bound to take community-generated information 
“into consideration for all its decisions when considering the 
accuracy of impact predictions” and when designing mitigation 
measures.219 Other companies view community data with more 
skepticism: one interviewee with experience working with 
agribusiness and forestry companies noted that companies 
would want to verify mapping done by farmers.  
Given their removal from the local context, lenders and investors 
may find community data helpful for due diligence and the 
improvement of risk assessments.220 This may be especially so 
given the growing acknowledgement by lenders, noted by a DFI 
environmental and social specialist, of a duty to know what is 
happening at project sites.221  
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6. INITIATING DOMESTIC MECHANISMS TO INCREASE 
PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
Domestic governance mechanisms, like “freedom of 
information” or “right to information” laws and parliamentary 
approval processes for incoming investment, can help increase 
disclosures and make decision-making more accountable.222 
Communities have, with and without support from allies, 
navigated their country’s right to information laws to obtain 
information. When visible and accessible to community 
members, such laws can increase community access to 
information.223 Certain design elements and approaches can 
bolster the transformative potential of such laws and minimize 
risks to community members. For instance, enabling 
anonymous information requests may help minimize the risk 
of reprisals.224 Further, a right to information framing can help 
emphasize that information access is a human right, and not 
something that gatekeepers should be able to control and 
arbitrarily curtail.225 Vigilance is also needed against overly 
broad exceptions to disclosure and other attacks on the right 
to information in contexts of democratic backsliding or 
shrinking civic space. 
Parliamentarians can build pressure for greater public 
disclosure and more inclusive decision-making about 
proposed investment projects.226 For instance, including 
parliamentarians as part of decision chains in investment 
approval may give them more leverage to push for increased 
public disclosures by the executive. They can also use existing 
parliamentary processes like budget allocation procedures to 
access information and push for public disclosure. Of course, 
parliamentarians themselves may not always be a force for 
increased transparency; a captured parliament may actually 
increase the risks of poor transparency.227 
 
7. EXTENDING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION BEYOND 
PROJECTS TO THE POLICY LEVEL 
The challenges and limitations of project-level participation 
through processes, such as consultations, indicate a need for 
communities to also influence the systems and norms that 
govern investments and accompanying transparency 
requirements. While the passing of laws can be met by serious 
deficiencies in implementation, it is still an important step with 
wide-ranging ramifications. Enabling community participation 
in the development of laws and policies can strengthen 
disclosure and community access, comprehension and use of 
information in three ways.  
First, communities and allies can directly push for laws and 
policies that operationalize information access (such as 
through right to information laws) and public participation 
(such as through requirements for participatory processes in 
the development of impact assessments). Communities and 
allies participating in policy and law development can also act 
as counterweights to elite influence over policy. They could 
therefore help to build and safeguard the norms underpinning 
an ecosystem of transparency and good governance, rather 
than simply being subject to laws agreed upon by elite actors. 
Second, communities can use law and policy processes to 
strengthen protections of community rights to give or withhold 
their FPIC and legitimate tenure rights. These rights can bolster 
community leverage when making demands for information and 
participation in investment-related decision-making (as discussed 
in 1. Driving agendas with community-led processes, above).  
Third, transparency entails open governance systems (see What 
is land investment transparency?, above). The development of 
laws and policies should therefore be open to the participation 
of communities and other rights holders. Community 
involvement in law and policy processes can also enhance the 
responsiveness of governance systems more broadly. 
In determining how to create openings for community 
participation in policy development, communities and their 
allies can draw inspiration from the experiences of Indigenous 
representative bodies and peasants’ movements.228 For 
example, Bolivia’s experiment with direct parliamentary 
representation of Indigenous peoples,229 while made possible 
by unique political circumstances and subject to challenges in 
practice,230 could offer inspiration. Similarly, Cameroon’s 
LandCam initiative, while still in its early stages, also pursues 
a model aimed at bridging communities and policy-level 
conversations. The initiative, which focuses on reforming 
Cameroonian land governance, encourages the participation 
of national and grassroots CSOs, along with Indigenous and 
women’s groups and representatives from project-affected 
communities, in iterative policy conversations. LandCam also 
facilitates dialogue with parliamentarians, policy makers, and 
the private sector. Emerging efforts for an Indigenous Voice in 
Australia are also grappling with ways to require regular 
government engagement with Indigenous perspectives on law 
and policy development.231 While these examples may not yet 
have led to systemic change or new laws, they demonstrate 
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The enduring governance and accountability challenges of land investments often 
have important links to the poor state of land investment transparency. While a 
means to other ends, improved transparency can be as beneficial for communities 
as for host governments, companies, and investment chain actors. This report calls 
on donors, global policy makers, and CSOs to conceive of transparency not simply 
as disclosure of relevant information, but as also including community access, 
comprehension, and use of that information in open decision-making processes and 
governance systems. Such actors must also design, and situate, transparency efforts 
as complements to more transformative governance frameworks, such as human 
rights, access to justice, and the protection of legitimate tenure rights. 
Set out below are recommendations, organized according to each of the seven strategies 
proposed in this report for advancing more effective land investment transparency. 
Other more general recommendations follow. In addition to serving as concrete steps 
for action, these recommendations are intended to contain seeds for the development 
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of additional insights and approaches to improve disclosure and 
to enhance communities’ abilities to access, understand, and use 
information. In doing so, these recommendations can help to 
ground land investment transparency efforts in the needs of the 
communities who so often bear the negative effects of land 
investments developed without their meaningful involvement.  
TABLE 1: RECOMMENDATIONS
Strategy Recommendation for donors Recommendation for  
global policy makers
Recommendation for civil 
society organizations
1. Driving agendas with 
community-led processes that 
set norms and expectations 
that advance transparency. 
(e.g., processes to develop 
autonomous community 
protocols, community bylaws, 
and community-driven 
development plans) 
See page 29, above. 
Support communities and 
their allies to implement 
community-led processes.  
Support strategies to bolster 
gatekeepers’ recognition and 




Underscore the legitimacy of 
community-led processes and 
the results of such processes.  
Set norms for when, and how, 
gatekeepers are required to 
incorporate the results of 
community-led processes into 
decisions.  
 
Continue to raise awareness 
about, and support the 
implementation of, community-
led processes. 
Find ways to bolster gatekeepers’ 
recognition and respect of the 
results of community-led 
processes.  
 
2. Increasing technical 
support for communities. 





Continue to support efforts to 
provide technical assistance to 
communities to enable them 
to access, understand, and use 
information. 
Support efforts aimed at 
increasing the availability of 
technical support, such as a 
basket fund for community 
support. 
Highlight the importance of 
community support in fulfilling 
rights inherent to transparency, 
such as FPIC and the right to 
information.  
In norms and programs, create 
expectations and requirements 
for gatekeepers to facilitate and 
finance independent community 
support. 
Continue to support 
communities to access and 
understand information, and to 
knowledgably participate in 
investment-related decisions. 
Amplify calls for gatekeepers to 
finance community support 
through mechanisms that 
guarantee independence of 
support. 
3. Empowering good faith 
regulators. 
See page 30, above. 
 
 
Support politically savvy efforts 
to bolster the influence and 




Continue to underscore the 
obligations of governments to 
regulate investment and enable 
land investment transparency.  
Develop programs to bolster 
the legitimacy and influence of 
good faith regulators. 
Find politically savvy ways to 






participatory processes at 
the project level. 
(e.g., dialogues, joint 
inspections, joint 
monitoring, and joint fact-
finding) 
See pages 30–31, above. 
Critically analyze proposals for 
multi-stakeholder processes, 
and support those that 
address power imbalances and 
have a real prospect of 
improving information sharing 
and informed community 
participation in investment-
related decision-making.  
When appropriate, facilitate 
multi-stakeholder processes 
that address power imbalances 
and have a real prospect of 
improving information sharing 




Support communities to 
knowledgably participate in 
multi-stakeholder processes, 
where appropriate.  
Continue to explore the potential 
for multi-stakeholder modalities to 
improve information sharing and 
opportunities for communities to 
influence decisions. 
5. Factoring community-
generated information into 
investment-related 
decisions. 




information-generation efforts.  
Support efforts to ensure 
decision-makers concretely 





Encourage use of community-
generated information as a 
legitimate and useful source of 
information for investment-
related decision-making. 
Support efforts to ensure that 
decision-makers concretely 
incorporate community-
generated information into 
investment-related decisions. 
Support communities to 
generate and use information.  
Explore and advance ways to 
ensure that decision-makers 
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TABLE 1: RECOMMENDATIONS - continued
Strategy Recommendation for donors Recommendation for  
global policy makers
Recommendation for civil 
society organizations
6. Initiating domestic 
mechanisms to increase 
public access to 
information. 






Continue to support efforts to 
enshrine and operationalize 
the right to information and, 








Continue to underscore the 
importance of the right to 
information and mechanisms for 
governments to fulfill it in practice. 
Continue to articulate the need 
to protect against the weakening 
of right-to-information processes 
and to protect rights holders who 
seek to invoke such processes. 
Support, when appropriate, 
mechanisms for parliamentary 
involvement in investment-
related decision-making. 
Continue to advocate for, and 
support communities to safely use, 
right-to-information processes.  
Advocate for such processes to be 
designed in ways that guard 
against the risk of retaliation for 
those who invoke them. 
Where appropriate, call for 
parliamentary involvement in 
investment-related decision-making 
and support parliamentarians to 
increase disclosure and community 
participation in decisions. 
7. Extending community 
participation beyond 
project-level to the policy 
level. 
See page 32, above. 
 
Support efforts to enable 
communities to influence the 
development of laws and 
policies that affect them, 
including concerning disclosure, 
information access, 
comprehension, and use in open 
decision-making processes. 
Underscore and advance the 
rights of communities to 
influence the development of 
laws and policies that affect 
them, and the modalities for 
doing so. 
 
Find effective and context-specific 
ways to enable communities to 
influence the development of 
laws and policies that affect them, 
including concerning disclosure 
and information access, 
comprehension, and use in open 
decision-making processes. 
Other transparency 














Support efforts that:  
•     conceive of transparency as 
extending beyond 
disclosure, to include 
community access, 
comprehension, and use of 
information in open 
processes; 
•     are grounded in the needs 
of communities and other 
local actors; and  





Design and implement efforts 
that: 
•     conceive of transparency as 
extending beyond disclosure, 
to include community access, 
comprehension, and use of 
information in open 
processes; 
•     are grounded in the needs of 
communities and other local 
actors; and 
•     seek to navigate, change, or 




Design and implement efforts 
that:  
•     conceive of transparency as 
extending beyond disclosure, 
to include community access, 
comprehension, and use of 
information in open processes; 
and 
•     are grounded in the needs of 
communities and other local 
actors; and 
•     seek to navigate, change, or 
circumvent political barriers. 
Build pressure for direct 
community participation and 
representation in relevant 
transparency efforts. 
On transparency more 
generally. 
See pages 8–9, above. 
Strategically support 
transparency efforts when they 
are needed to complement—or 
fill voids created by the 
blockage of—more 
transformational frameworks 
for improving the governance 
and accountability of land 
investments. 
Strategically use transparency 
framings and programming to 
complement—or fill voids 
created by the blockage of— 
more transformational 
frameworks for improving the 
governance and accountability 
of land investments. 
Strategically pursue transparency 
when it can productively 
complement—or fill voids created 
by the blockage of—more 
transformational frameworks for 
improving the governance and 
accountability of land 
investments. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
This report forms part of a portfolio of research conducted by 
CCSI on a demand-driven approach to the transparency of land 
investments, focusing on the transparency needs of project-
affected communities and host governments. It is based on 36 
semi-structured interviews and 12 unstructured interviews and 
extensive desktop research, including a focus on literature 
produced by, or heavily focused on the perspectives of, project-
affected communities and their local allies. The report also 
draws from country-specific field and desktop research on land 
investment transparency in Cameroon and Liberia. In addition 
to land investments, it draws from experiences in other sectors, 
such as infrastructure and the extractive industries. 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from project-
affected communities in Cameroon, Guyana, Kenya, and 
Liberia, and civil society actors supporting communities in 
Argentina, Colombia, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ghana, India, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal, Haiti, Sierra 
Leone, and Tanzania. Host government representatives 
interviewed included officials at ministries of agriculture, 
environment, and land, as well as investment promotion 
agencies and a special economic zone, and current and former 
members of parliament. These government representatives 
came from Cameroon, one other Central African country, 
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Private 
sector and DFI interviewees included current and former 
environmental and social experts, sustainability managers, as 
well as representatives focusing on external relations, global 
affairs, loans and finance, and responsible investment 
stewardship; their interviews drew on experiences with land, 
resource, or infrastructure projects in Canada, Ghana, Guinea, 
Laos, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, and South Africa.  
CCSI’s broader research portfolio on land investment 
transparency benefitted from regular advice and dialogue with 
an expert advisory group that included:  
•       Joan Carling, Co-Convener of the Indigenous Peoples 
Major Group for the SDGs and of the Right Energy 
Partnership 
•       Nsama Nsemiwe Chikolwa, Land Policy Coordinator for 
the African Union 
•       Lorenzo Cotula, Principal Researcher on Law and 
Sustainable Development at the International Institute 
for Environment and Development 
•       Erin Kitchell, Director of Global Programs at Namati 
•       Megan MacInnes, Scottish Land Commissioner and 
former Land Advisor at Global Witness 
•       Win Min, Senior Programme Associate for Tourism, ICT, 
and Regulatory at the Myanmar Centre for Responsible 
Business
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This annex lists known types of information that communities and their allies may need 
in the context of land-based investment.232 It is organized temporally according to the 
potential life cycle of such investments, though there will be overlap between these 
stages. All such information should also be made available in language and formats that 
are comprehensible to communities, including non-technical summaries of documents, 
as discussed in Information comprehension, above.
Timing Type of information
Rights and laws, generally 
 • Individual rights to information, participation, association, and, where relevant, to give or withhold free, prior and 
informed consent. 
• Community rights to land and other natural resources.233 
• Content of laws, regulations, policies, bylaws, and land use plans governing the management of lands and resources, 
and investment. 
• General understanding of legal frameworks and the range of decision-making processes potentially available. 
• Demonstration of how rights and processes have been effectively used in the country or elsewhere.234  
 
Opportunities for land investment by communities 
• Ways for communities to participate in, contribute to, and develop their own, proposals for land investments. 
 
Project proposal, implications, and decision-making processes 
 • The proposed nature, objectives, and size of the project.235 
• The location (including boundaries, maps, and geographical coordinates) of the project and any areas that will be 
affected, and any neighboring or overlapping projects.236 
• Preliminary assessments of the project’s likely negative impacts (such as is contained negative environmental, social, 
and human rights impacts), and preliminary plans for avoidance and mitigation of identified negative impacts. 
• Preliminary assessments of the project’s likely positive impacts, including information enabling communities to 
distinguish between promises and reality.237 Data about benefit spending and employment creation should be 
granular and disaggregated to avoid raising expectations, and explain how these will meet the community’s 
conception of benefit, rather than the company’s conception.238 
• Likely payments to be made to the host government, and how such payments will reach the community.239 
• Information about the project’s aftermath, including what the land will be like afterwards and what generational 
impacts are likely to occur.240 
• Reports commissioned or generated about the project, including impact assessments, baseline studies, scoping 
reports, feasibility studies, plans, and other external reviews. 
• Plans for stakeholder engagement and community consultation, including how community feedback will be 
incorporated into project design. 
• Alternative formulations of the project that would minimize potential adverse impacts.241 
• Alternative development pathways and comparisons between those and the proposed project.242 
 
Applicable rights, laws, and processes 
• Evidence of company compliance with applicable laws.243 
• The applicable criteria, procedures and timelines for the assessment, approval and establishment of the investment 
and any land conversion.244 This includes permitting, bidding, contracting, the calculation of compensation, and 
community consultations.245 
• Community rights relating to public purpose expropriations and forced resettlement.  
• All authorizations and permits, and contracts, including investor-state contracts, community-investor contracts, and 
associated subcontracts and documents with intermediary actors or other landholders.246 
• All government entities involved in authorizing and regulating the investment project, including contact information 
for relevant individuals at each entity.247 
• Applicable avenues to seek additional access to information established domestically or by the company, investment 
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Timing Type of information
 The company (or companies) carrying out the project 
 • The company’s directors, shareholders and beneficiaries, parent and associated companies, incorporation details and 
related documents, company addresses both in the host country and, if the company is foreign-owned, the company’s 
country of domicile. 
• The involvement in the company of any “politically exposed persons”—those entrusted with prominent public 
functions within the host country.248 
• The company’s membership in any certification bodies, sustainability initiatives, and industry associations. 
• Relevant company policies, codes of conduct, and decision-making processes, including community engagement and 
consultation plans and processes, and grievance mechanisms.249 
• The company's relevant track record and experience. This includes: past involvement in any disputes regarding, or 
violations of, tenure or human rights; any other negative environmental or social impacts; and any past illegal, corrupt, 
or unethical conduct; previous experience with similar types of projects; histories of solvency, acquisition and 
abandonment of projects; and copies of the company’s recent financial statements or, if it is a new company, bank 
statements showing the capital secured for the investment. 
• Contact information for the company’s lead on investment. 
 
Investment chain actors and financiers 
• The project’s lenders, equity investors, and insurers. This should include disclosures of involvement by financial 
institutions that invest via intermediary institutions.250 
• Applicable performance standards and other conditions applying to the company. 
• Contact information for project leads at relevant lenders, investors and insurers.  
 
Buyers and other value chain actors 
• Lists of actual and intended purchasers of the commodities produced, and other actors in the supply chain. This 
includes traders, who buy commodities from companies and sell on to manufacturers and other end users, entities 
that buy commodities for their own production purposes, and intermediaries who may play a connective role in 
connecting agricultural producers to end users.251 It also includes contractors who provide services or carry out jobs on 
behalf of the project.252 
• Information about likely and intended destination countries for the commodities.253 
 
Available avenues for grievance redress  
• Domestic legal and administrative avenues for redress.254 
• Applicable non-judicial grievance mechanisms established by, or otherwise linked to, the company, its lenders and 
investors, their customers, and certification and sustainability initiatives.255 
 
Updates on company conduct and project impacts 
 • Timely and predictable updates on changes and progress made for any of the above. 
• Regular “refreshes” of explanations to communities regarding the terms of the above, maintenance of ongoing access 
to documents, and provision of information that is lost or otherwise no longer available.256 
• The terms of royalties and other transfers to be made to the community, regardless of whether such terms are 
included in community-company agreements or other instruments. 
• Regular, timely and meaningfully disaggregated reporting on: company production and profits;257 compliance with 
laws and contracts; benefits shared and transfers made both to community members and government entities;258 
negative impacts caused and measures taken to address those; modalities for ongoing community participation in 
decision-making, dialogue processes, and grievance mechanisms.  
 
What will happen after the project ends 
 • Who the land will revert to following the company’s exit, and the process for returning control of the land. 
• Responsibilities, and the process, for rehabilitating any damage to the land caused by the investment. 
• Remedy pathways for any right violations or losses incurred, and avenues for obtaining those. 
• How any benefit sharing or community development arrangements linked to the project will be affected by the 
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“Rather than assuming that transparency in itself will help 
improve governance or accountability, we must ask the 
question, “for whom?” Drawing on research in Cameroon, 
Liberia, and from around the globe, this report calls on donors, 
global policy makers, and civil society organizations to ground 
transparency efforts in the perspectives of local actors.  
This means conceiving of transparency not simply as disclosure 
of relevant information, but as also including community 
access, comprehension, and use of that information in open 
decision-making processes and governance systems.”
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